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Substance and Procedure in Capital Cases: Why
Federal Habeas Courts Should Review the Merits of
Every Death Sentence
Joseph L. Hoffmann*

I.

Introduction

For the past twenty-five years, the law of federal habeas corpus has
been inextricably intertwined with the law of the death penalty. Every
capital case is fought primarily on the legal battleground of habeas. Every
habeas reform is motivated largely by concerns about the impact of habeas
on the administration of the death penalty. It is thus no coincidence that
the most important federal habeas legislation enacted since the original
Habeas Corpus Act of 18671 was a part of the Antiterrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act of 1996.2 At least in our time, any meaningful discussion about habeas must take account of the relationship between habeas and

the death penalty.
But what is the nature of that relationship? Today, we generally take
for granted that the purpose of federal habeas in state capital cases (as in
all other state criminal cases) is to provide a mechanism for the litigation
of federal constitutional criminal procedure issues arising primarily under
the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments.3 Undoubtedly such

* Professor of Law, Indiana University-Bloomington. The author would like to thank the
participants in this symposium for their many helpful comments and suggestions. Special thanks go
to the habeas panelists, Jordan Steiker, Steve Bright, Jim Liebman, and Larry Yackle, and Evan
Caminker. The author would also like to thank the faculty, staff, and judge-students at the National
Judicial College who helped him develop the ideas expressed herein during twelve years of teaching
the College's "Handling Capital Cases" course for state trial judges. Finally, the author would like
to thank Bill Stuntz for his many contributions to the author's thoughts about habeas and capital cases.
1. Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, § 1, 14 Stat. 385.
2. Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 107(a), 110 Stat. 1214, 1221 (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 2261-2266
(Supp. IV 1998)).
3. Fourth Amendment search and seizure claims are no longer directly cognizable on habeas
corpus as a result of the Supreme Court's decision in Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976) (holding
that federal habeas corpus relief is not available to a prisoner who previously has been afforded the
opportunity for full and fair consideration of his search and seizure claim at trial). But cf. Kimmelman
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procedural matters are properly within the scope of habeas, but is that all
there is to habeas in capital cases?
A quarter-century ago, the answer to this question was not at all clear.
In Furman v. Georgia,4 the United States Supreme Court held that the
death penalty, at least under then-existing state and federal capital sentencing statutes, violated the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on "cruel and
unusual punishments." 5 Four years later, when the Court decided that the
new post-Furman death penalty statutes enacted in Georgia, 6 Florida,7 and
Texas' satisfied the Eighth Amendment's requirement of rationality and
predictability in capital sentencing,9 no one could predict the future
direction of constitutional death penalty law. Of course, all capital cases
would still need to comply with the same Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and
Fourteenth Amendment procedural rules applicable to other criminal cases.
But would the United States Constitution impose any additional requirements? More specifically, after Gregg, would the Eighth Amendment fade
from view, leaving further questions about the validity of individual death
sentences imposed under the new statutes to be decided by state law? Or
would the Eighth Amendment continue to play a more significant role?
Shortly after Gregg, lawyers representing several death row inmates
tried to persuade the Court to adopt an interpretation of the Eighth
Amendment that would have ensured an active role for federal habeas
courts in the substantive supervision of state death sentencing. In a series
of cases, the defense argued to the Court that the Eighth Amendment not
only regulated states in their enactments of death penalty statutes but also
v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365 (1986) (holding that a Sixth Amendment claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel is cognizable on habeas even though the defense lawyer's alleged error consisted of a failure
to raise a Fourth Amendment claim properly in earlier state proceedings).
4. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
5. The Eighth Amendment reads, in full: "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
6. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
7. Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976).
8. Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976).
9. The requirement that death sentencing be rational and predictable, which is based on the views
expressed in the separate opinions of the five Justices who found the death penalty unconstitutional in
Furman, see infra notes 39-40 and accompanying text, is one of two key Eighth Amendment procedural
requirements for capital sentencing that have been imposed by the Court. The second is the
requirement of individualized sentencing, which in turn requires sentencer consideration of all
mitigating evidence an individual defendant facing a possible death sentence seeks to offer. See Lockett
v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 605-06 (1978). Recently, at least some members of the Court have concluded
that these two requirements are incompatible. See, e.g., Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 673 (1990)
(Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (arguing that the Lockett requirement
be abandoned); Graham v. Collins, 506 U.S. 461,478 (1993) (Thomas, J., concurring) (agreeing with
Justice Scalia's argument in Walton, and arguing for the abandonment of the Lockett requirement);
Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1156 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting from the denial of certiorari)
(arguing for the abolition of the death penalty based on its inability to satisfy the incompatible
requirements imposed by Furman and Lockett).
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limited the case-by-case imposition of the death penalty to particular kinds
of crimes and criminals.'0
For example, in Lockett v. Ohio," the defense contended that on the
particular facts and circumstances of the case, the Eighth Amendment
would be violated by giving Lockett the death penalty because she was only

a young, relatively minor participant in a murder committed by others.
Similarly, in Godfrey v. Georgia,2 the defense argued that-again, on the
particular facts and circumstances of the case-the Eighth Amendment
prohibited the death penalty for Godfrey because he killed his victims
instantly in the heat of a domestic dispute, 3 did not cause unnecessary
pain or suffering to his victims, and afterwards calmly turned himself in to
the police. In short, in Lockett, Godfrey, and several other early postGregg cases, defense lawyers asked the Court to interpret the Eighth

Amendment 4as a case-specific substantive constitutional limit on capital
punishment.1
The Supreme Court, however, declined to do so. Instead, the Court

in each case found a procedural flaw in the way the particular case was
handled. In Lockett, for example, the Court ruled that Ohio should not
have imposed any limits on the mitigating evidence sought to be introduced
by the defendant.' 5 In Godfrey, the Court held that Georgia's statutory
standard of eligibility for the death penalty was unconstitutionally vague.' 6
Although most of the procedural flaws identified by the Court in Lockett,
Godfrey, and similar cases would not have violated existing federal constitutional standards for criminal cases in general, the Court found them to
be intolerable in capital cases. The Court chose to characterize these

10. See, e.g., Brief for Petitioner at 61-68, Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978) (No. 76-6997);
Petition for Certiorari at 42-45, Lockett, 438 U.S. 586 (No. 76-6997) (both arguing that sentencing
.non-triggermen" accomplices in a homicide to death is unconstitutional); see also Pulley v. Harris,
465 U.S. 37 (1984) (rejecting the defendant's argument that a comparative proportionality review is
required in each death penalty case); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982) (reversing a death
sentence because the trial judge refused to consider mitigating evidence); Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S.
420 (1980) (reversing a death sentence because the particular crimes committed did not meet the
statutory standard of "a consciousness materially more 'depraved' than that of any person guilty of
murder").
11. 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
12. 446 U.S. 420 (1980).
13. Today, society's changed views about the horrors of domestic violence would probably render
Godfrey's crime more likely deserving of death than it was in 1980.
14. Throughout this article, I will use the terms "substance" and "substantive" to refer to two
kinds of claims that might be made by a defendant who has been convicted and sentenced to death: (1)
the claim that the defendant is in fact innocent of the crime, and (2) the claim that the defendant,
although guilty of the crime, nevertheless does not deserve the death penalty. The first of these claims
is a claim of factual error in the guilt/innocence determination, which may or may not be accompanied
by a procedural legal error. The second claim does not necessarily involve either a factual or a
procedural legal error. Rather, it is a claim of moral error-that is, a claim that the defendant's death
sentence does not comport with the moral values of the community.
15. Lockett, 438 U.S. at 608.
16. Godfrey, 446 U.S. at 431-32.
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procedural flaws as violations of the Eighth Amendment, thus giving rise
to the so-called "super due process" interpretation of that constitutional
provision that prevails today.17
We can only speculate about why the Court chose to treat the Eighth
Amendment as a procedural rather than substantive check on individual
death sentences. But, with the benefit of hindsight, we can easily observe
the consequences of the choice. The Court's choice has helped to ensure
that capital habeas litigation almost always focuses solely on the procedures
by which the defendant was convicted and sentenced rather than on the
crucial substantive questions of whether the defendant is in fact guilty and,
even if guilty, whether he deserves a death sentence.' 8 No matter how
strongly the habeas court may feel that the jury-or the judge, in a nonjury trial-has made a substantive error in the defendant's conviction or
death sentence, the habeas court is virtually powerless to act directly and
reverse the defendant's conviction or death sentence on the basis of such
doubts.
This disability is an extreme manifestation of the problem of so-called
"excessive proceduralism" in habeas corpus that Professor Jordan Steiker
has recently described, criticized, and tried to remedy. 9 Steiker's article
deals primarily with the relationship between habeas procedural issues and
the underlying issues of federal constitutional criminal procedure, which he
calls the "merits" that often become lost in the battle over habeas
He proposes significant changes in the rules of habeas,
procedures.'
designed to eliminate or greatly reduce the relative importance of habeas
procedural issues, and thereby allow habeas courts to reach more easily the
merits of death row inmates' constitutional claims. 2' He argues that such
changes would benefit both death row inmates, by ensuring that the merits
of their constitutional claims are addressed by habeas courts, and the states,

17. See Margaret 1. Radin, Cruel Punishment and Respect for Persons:Super Due Processfor
Death, 53 S. CAL. L. REV. 1143, 1148 (1980) (suggesting that "the human dignity to personhood
standard has both a 'substantive' and 'procedural' aspect; that the same result for persons that gives
form to the retributivist substantive limitation on punishment also engenders a super due process
procedural limitation").
18. Professor William Stuntz has argued that this shift in capital litigation focus is the result of
both the Court's failure to validate substantive Eighth Amendment claims and the rational responses
of various criminal justice actors, particularly defense lawyers, to the incentives created by procedural
Eighth Amendment litigation. See William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship Between Criminal
Procedure and CriminalJustice, 107 YALE L.J. 1, 44 (1997) ("It is not only that constitutional law has
been too loath to regulate substance in the law of capital punishment. The point is that heavy
procedural regulation has tended to drive substance away.").
19. See Jordan Steiker, Restructuring Post-Conviction Review of Federal Constitutional Claims
Raised by State Prisoners:Confronting the New Face ofExcessive Proceduralism,1998 U. CHI. LEGAL
F. 315.
20. Id. at 317.
21. Id. at 320-21, 345-46.
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by reducing the time and money now devoted to the litigation of habeas
procedural issues.'
In this Article, I will propose a more radical response to the problem
of excessive proceduralism in capital habeas cases. I will argue that,
through reinterpretation of the Eighth Amendment, the United States
Supreme Court should empower federal habeas courts not only to address
the merits of death row inmates' federal constitutional criminal procedure
claims, but also to address and remedy substantive errors in the conviction
and sentencing of those death row inmates. I will demonstrate how the
Court's post-Gregg Eighth Amendment decisions have led inexorably to the
current spate of procedural restrictions on federal habeas-restrictions that
have not only damaged the overall viability of the writ, but also contributed
to the substantive arbitrariness of death sentencing.' Near the end of the
Article, I will argue that the only solution to this serious problem is for the
Court to reverse course and declare that the Eighth Amendment imposes
substantive limits on the case-by-case imposition of capital punishment.24
This change, in turn, would require habeas courts to review the merits of
every capital case, including both the defendant's guilt and the deservedness of the death sentence, a development that would not only improve the
quality of substantive justice in capital cases, but also secure the future of
habeas itself.
II.

The Cycle of the Supreme Court's Modern Death Penalty
Jurisprudence

In order to understand habeas today, we must begin with a review of
the developments of the past twenty-five years both in habeas law itself and
in Eighth Amendment death penalty law. Although the Supreme Court's
Eighth Amendment decisions at first glance may seem haphazard, upon
closer inspection it is possible to discern a clear pattern among them. In
retrospect, it is increasingly obvious that this pattern-an endless, vicious
cycle that has led to the excessive proceduralism of federal habeas law
described by Steiker-was the inevitable result of the Court's misguided
attempt to use procedural solutions to solve substantive problems.'

22. Id. at 321-23, 346-47.
23. See infra notes 56-59 and accompanying text.
24. See infra Part III.
25. See generally Steiker, supra note 19.
26. I do not suggest that the pattern I am about to describe was the result of a conscious, selfaware choice made by the Court or any of its individual members; rather, I suggest only that it can be
seen, in retrospect, as a predictable and logical consequence of the Court's Eighth Amendment

decisions.
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JURISPRUDENCE
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McGauthav. Calif. (1971)
Furman v. Ga. (1972)
Gregg v. Ga. (1976)
LEGISLATIVE HABEAS REFORM
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AEDPA (1996)
Felker v. Turpin (1996)
Calderon v. Thompson (1998)
Stewart v. Martinez-Villareal (1998)
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T. Williams v. Taylor (2000)
Edwards v. Carpenter (2000)
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PROCEDURAL "SUPER
DUE PROCESS":
Lockett v. Ohio (1978)
Godfrey v. Ga. (1980)

8TH AMENDMENT
"HARMLESS ERROR":
Zant v. Stephens (1983)
Barclay v. Fla. (1983)

Herrera v. Collins (1993)
INNOCENCE

AND BRADY

CLAIMS:
Kyles v. Whitley (1995)
Strickler v. Greene (1999)
INNOCENCE AND
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE
OF COUNSEL CLAIMS:
Strickland v. Washington (1984)
Kimmelman v. Morrison (1986)

PROCEDURAL LIMITS ON
FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS:
Wainwright v. Sykes (1977)
Rose v. Lundy (1982)
Kuhlmann v. Wilson (1986)
Teague v. Lane (1989)
Butler v. McKellar (1990)
McCleksey v. Zant (1991)
Brecht v. Abrahamson (1993)

DE NOVO REVIEW FOR
MIXED QUESTIONS OF
FACT AND LAW:
Wright v. West (1992)

V

"FUNDAMENTAL
MISCARRIAGE OF JUSTICE"
AS AN EXCEPTION TO
HABEAS LIMITATIONS:
Murray v. Carrier (1986)
Kuhlmann v. Wilson (1986)
Smith v. Murray (1986)
McCleskey v. Zant (1991)
Coleman v. Thompson (1991)
Sawyer v. Whitley (1992)
Schlup v. Delo (1995)
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My current argument builds directly on one I first presented in a 1993
Indiana Law Journal article.' There, I noted that even during the early
1990s, the allegedly conservative, pro-state Supreme Court continued to
grant review of, and frequently reverse, state death penalty cases. Recent
evidence, including new evidence presented in this symposium, suggests
that the same thing can be said today, and perhaps with even more conviction, about current allegedly conservative, pro-state lower federal courts.'
What can explain this phenomenon? Surely part of the answer is that
federal judges, who are usually situated procedurally closer than their state
counterparts to a capital defendant's ultimate day of reckoning, are strongly
motivated as human beings to do whatever is within their judicial powerand perhaps, on occasion, even a few things outside of that power 9-to
ensure that no person is unjustly put to death. Aware of the risks of both
conviction and capital sentencing error and often feeling a heightened sense
of judicial responsibility for the defendant's fate, the Supreme Court-like
many lower federal courts-has long viewed death as different.3" As
Justice Souter recently wrote for a majority of the Court, "[o]ur duty to
search for constitutional error with painstaking care is never more exacting
than it is in a capital case."3"
The most direct judicial action a federal judge can take to block an
unjust execution is to rule that the death penalty is unconstitutional as
applied to the individual defendant.
Yet, with only a few rare
exceptions, 2 the Court has consistently declined to define the appropriate
role of the federal courts in this way. Instead, as most lawyers are wont
to do, the Court has tended to seek procedural solutions to substantive
problems.

27. Joseph L. Hoffmann, Is Innocence Sufficient? An Essay on the U.S. Supreme Court's
Continuing Problems with FederalHabeas Corpus and the Death Penalty, 68 IND. L.J. 817 (1993)
[hereinafter Hoffmann, Is Innocence Sufficient?].

28. See Donald P. Lay, The Writ of Habeas Corpus:A Complex Procedurefor a Simple Process,
77 MINN. L. REv. 1015, 1044 n.166 (1993) (noting that federal courts grant 50-75% of the capital
petitions for habeas corpus that they consider); James Liebman, Jeffrey Fagan, Valerie West, and James
Lloyd, CapitalAttrition: Error Rates in Capital Cases 1978-1995, 78 TEXAS L. REV. 1839, 1849
(2000) (calculating a reversal rate of 40% by federal habeas courts).
29. See the remarkable dialogue between the federal district court, sitting in habeas, and the U.S.
Supreme Court in the case of Robert Alton Harris, who was executed in California in 1992. After a
series of last-minute stays of execution, granted by the district court, were overturned on appeal by the
state, the Supreme Court eventually issued an extraordinary order barring any further stays. See
Gomez v. United States Dist. Court for the N. Dist. of Cal., 503 U.S. 653 (1992).
30. See, e.g., Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976) (Stewart, J., plurality
opinion) (holding that the "qualitative difference" between death and all other penalties requires a
greater degree of "reliability in the determination that death is the appropriate punishment in a specific
case").

31. Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 422 (1995) (quoting Baker v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776, 785
(1987)).
32. See infra notes 49-51.
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This tendency dates all the way back to the start of the modem era of
American death penalty law in the early 1970s, when the Court decided
McGautha v. California,33 Furman v. Georgia,3 4 and Gregg v.
Georgia." All three cases involved systemic challenges to the manner by
which the death penalty was being administered in the states and, together,
these three cases substantially changed that manner of administration.
In McGautha, the Court narrowly upheld the existing state capital
punishment systems against a claim that they violated the Constitution by
relying on unconstrained jury discretion to decide whether individual
defendants would or would not receive the death penalty.36 The decision
was noteworthy for the classic debate between Justice Harlan, writing for
the majority, and Justice Brennan, in dissent, over the issue of discretion
versus rules in capital sentencing. According to Harlan, discretionary
capital sentencing by juries representing the moral view of the community
was the best that could be done: "To identify before the fact those characteristics of criminal homicides and their perpetrators which call for the
death penalty, and to express these characteristics in language which can
be fairly understood and applied by the sentencing authority, appear to be
tasks which are beyond present human ability."" Brennan responded
with a defense of due process legal standards: "But discretion, to be
worthy of the name, is not unchanneled judgment; it is judgment guided by
reason and kept within bounds."3 8
Just one year later, in Furman, the Court held five to four that all
existing state death penalty statutes, which were based on a discretionary
model of capital sentencing, violated the Eighth Amendment. There were
nine separate opinions, but only two of the five Justices in the majority,
Justices Brennan and Marshall, found the death penalty itself, on substantive grounds, unconstitutional. 9 In contrast, Justices White, Stewart,
and Douglas based their votes against the death penalty on the infrequency,
arbitrariness, and discriminatory impact, respectively, of the capital
sentencing results reached under the existing state statutes.40 Their
opinions encouraged states to try to develop new death penalty statutes that
would cure these defects.

33. 402 U.S. 183 (1971).
34. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
35. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
36. See McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 196 (1970) (rejecting petitioners' claim "that the
absence of standards to guide the jury's discretion on the punishment issue is constitutionally
intolerable").
37. Id. at 204.

38. Id. at 285 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
39. See Furman, 408 U.S. at 305 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 359 (Marshall, J., concurring).
40. Id. at 311-12 ,Vhite, J., concurring); id. at 310 (Stewart, J., concurring); id. at 257 (Douglas,
J., concurring).
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The new breed of death penalty statutes made their way up to the
Supreme Court in Gregg v. Georgia.41 The Court in Gregg and its companion cases upheld the new statutes of Georgia, Florida, and Texas, which
in one form or another relied upon the Model Penal Code's concept of
"guided discretion"-capital sentencing discretion "guided" by statutorily
defined aggravating and mitigating circumstances. 42 Two other statutes,
those of North Carolina and Louisiana, were rejected because they
eliminated all sentencing discretion by making the death penalty mandatory
for certain crimes. 43 The Court concluded that such mandatory statutes
were inconsistent with the individualized consideration necessary to
produce just death sentences. 4 Gregg confirmed that, at least in the view
of the majority, the Furman problem of irrational and unjust sentencing
outcomes could be solved simply by adopting and implementing better
capital sentencing procedures.
Although Gregg clearly represented at least a temporary end to the
Court's interest in entertaining systemic challenges to the death penalty,45
the years immediately following Gregg were marked by uncertainty about
the future course of constitutional death penalty litigation. Opponents of
capital punishment were not about to give up, even though the Court in
Gregg had generally authorized the resumption of death sentencing. But
the abolition strategy, which had previously emphasized systemic challenges to state capital punishment systems, had to change.
In several early post-Gregg cases, the Court was confronted with the
new claim that the improved capital sentencing procedures approved in
Gregg had failed to prevent a death sentence for a defendant who did not

41. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
42. See id. at 193-94, 196-98 (describing the Model Penal Code's "controlled discretion" standard
and explaining that Georgia's law fits this standard and conforms to the Constitution); Proffitt v.
Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 247-52, 259-60 (1976) (announcing that Florida's death penalty statute, based
on the Model Penal Code, satisfies the Constitution by ensuring an "informed, focused, guided, and
objective inquiry" into the appropriateness of a death sentence); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 276
(1976) (upholding the Texas statute which, although less formalized than the Florida and Georgia

statutes, requires an aggravating factor for death and allows for the presentation of mitigating factors).
43. See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976); Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325

(1976).
44. See Woodson, 428 U.S. at 304 ("[W]e believe that in capital cases the fundamental respect for
humanity underlying the Eighth Amendment ... requires consideration of the character and record of
the individual offender and the circumstances of the particular offense, as a constitutionally
indispensable part of the process of inflicting the penalty of death."); Roberts, 428 U.S. at 333-36
(rejecting Louisiana's mandatory death penalty law because of its failure to allow for individualized
consideration of aggravating and mitigating factors).
45. The Court did not address another systemic challenge to the death penalty until its decision
in McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987), which upheld the Georgia death penalty system against
a claim that it discriminated based on the race of the victim.
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deserve to die. In Lockett v. Ohio and Godfrey v. Georgia,47 for
example, the defense argued that the death sentences were barred-on casespecific substantive grounds-by the Eighth Amendment. As I explained
in my 1993 article:
The Court could have decided that, under the totality of the
circumstances, the Eighth Amendment barred the imposition of a
death sentence against Sandra Lockett. This substantive position was
in fact advocated by Lockett's attorneys (who included Anthony
Amsterdam) in both the petition for certiorari and the brief on the
merits. Instead, however, the Court chose to reverse Sandra
Lockett's death sentence on a procedural ground, apparently
concluding that the sentencing judge would have reached the right
result if only the Ohio statute had not prevented him from
considering Lockett's minor role in the crime [and other factors] as
a "mitigating circumstance[]."
Similarly, in Godfrey v. Georgia, where the defendant instantly
killed his wife and mother-in-law with a shotgun during a domestic
dispute, and then calmly turned himself in to the police, the Court
could have declared that such a case simply was not a proper one for
the imposition of a death sentence. Rather, the Court chose to
reverse Godfrey's death sentence on another procedural ground,
apparently concluding that the jury would have reached the right
sentencing result if only it had received a proper instruction about the
statute's "aggravating circumstance" provision requiring that the
crime be [found to be "outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or
inhuman... "].
In these and other post-Gregg decisions, the Court has struggled
mightily to find procedural solutions to what appear to have been, at
bottom, substantive disagreements with the outcomes of the particular
.8
cases 4
Why did the Court choose the procedural route over the substantive
one? Some of the early post-Gregg cases presented compelling examples
of defendants whose death sentences must have seemed substantively
wrong, at least to some members of the Court. Yet the Court refused to
render substantive rulings in such cases. Indeed, in the entire quartercentury since Gregg, the Court has excluded only three categories of
crimes and criminals from death-penalty eligibility on substantive grounds:

46.
47.
48.
Lockett,

438 U.S. 586 (1978).
446 U.S. 420 (1980).
Hoffmann, Is Innocence Sufficient?, supra note 27, at 823-24 (footnotes omitted) (quoting
438 U.S. at 608, and Godfrey, 446 U.S. at 431).
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rapists who did not kill,49 felony-murderers who did not kill and who
lacked heightened culpability for the death,' and murderers who killed
before they reached the age of sixteen." All other reversals have been
on procedural grounds.

One possible explanation for the Court's preference for procedure may
be the significant counter-majoritarian dilemma posed by the Eighth
Amendment. As I have noted elsewhere, 52 a substantive Eighth Amendment decision to reverse a death sentence requires the Court to declare that
society itself, as represented by the jury and judges who participated in the

particular case, has acted in a cruel and unusual way. This kind of
declaration, which cannot easily be hidden from society behind technical
jargon or legal analysis, threatens to put the Court in an uncomfortable
counter-majoritarian position. That the Court has tended to shy away from
such a direct challenge to society's moral choices is not surprising.
This reluctance may be related to a second explanation, namely, that
lawyers in general often see the world in procedural rather than substantive
terms. Lawyers, after all, are professionally trained to focus on procedures
and often suppress their substantive opinions in order to represent clients
with whose views they may strongly disagree. 3
A third and final reason why the modem Court has chosen the pro-

cedural route lies in its strong concern for federalism. As Chief Justice
Rehnquist has put it, "[flew rulings would be more disruptive of our
federal system than to provide for federal habeas review of free-standing
I will argue later that this concern for
claims of actual innocence."'

49. See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977) (holding that the death sentence in a rape
case is "grossly disproportionate and excessive punishment" and "forbidden by the Eighth
Amendment").
50. See Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137 (1987) (holding that a criminal must both participate in
a major felony and exhibit a reckless disregard for human life to justify the imposition of the death
penalty); Emnund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982) (finding that ordering the execution of a getaway
car driver who lacked the intent to kill violates the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments).
51. See Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989) (holding that imposing the death penalty on
a seventeen-year-old does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment); Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487
U.S. 815 (1988) (holding that sentencing a defendant under sixteen years of age to death violates the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments).
52. See Joseph L. Hoffmann, The "Cruel and UnusualPunishment Clause":A Limit on the Power
to Punish or Constitutional Rhetoric?, in THE BILL OF RIGHTS IN MODERN AMERICA AFrER 200
YEARs 139, 143 (David 3. Bodenhamer & James W. Ely, Jr., eds., 1993) (arguing that a finding that
the death penalty is cruel and unusual punishment puts the court in a position of "'legislating' moral
standards rather than 'adjudicating' them").
53. See Hoffmann, Is Innocence Sufficient?, supra note 27, at 822 ("Lawyers and judges tend to
if a procedure can be improved enough, then the results produced by that
believe . . . that .
procedure will necessarily be right."); see also Stuntz, supra note 18, at 39-40 (identifying incentivebased reasons why defense lawyers, in particular, often prefer to make procedural rather than
substantive claims on behalf of their clients).
54. Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 401 (1993).
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federalism is misplaced-that in fact, the current situation of procedural
death-penalty habeas litigation represents a greater intrusion on the
prerogative of the states to carry out their respective capital punishment
policies than would the alternative of substantive review of state death
sentences by federal habeas courts.55 But a majority of the Court seems
to have believed, throughout the past twenty-five years, that it would
somehow offend the states for federal habeas courts to review the substantive merits of capital sentencing decisions rendered and approved by

state courts.
Whatever the reasons for its choice, the procedural approach adopted
by the Court has turned out to be highly problematic for the states. When
the Court decided Lockett, Godfrey, and other early post-Gregg death
penalty cases on procedural rather than substantive grounds, it meant that
not only the individual defendant's death sentence, but also the death
Before long,
sentences of many other defendants, were invalidated. 6
federal habeas courts-which carried the bulk of the burden of enforcing

the Court's new Eighth Amendment procedural mandates 7-were reversing a substantial percentage of the death sentences that came before them
for review. 8 Many of these death sentences, unlike the ones in Lockett
and Godfrey, were not substantively questionable; yet they had to be
reversed all the same. In other words, the Court's procedural approach
inevitably led to the over-reversal, measured in substantive terms, of state
death sentences. I have previously explained why this is so:
There are two major difficulties with an essentially processoriented solution to a substantive problem, such as the problem of
bad outcomes in death-penalty cases. First, and most obviously

55. See infra text accompanying note 163.
56. Most of the early post-Gregg Eighth Amendment decisions were applied retroactively, both
to cases still pending on direct appeal and to habeas cases. It was not until the Court's decision in
Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989), that new constitutional criminal procedure decisions were held
generally inapplicable to habeas cases. See generally Joseph L. Hoffmann, The Supreme Court'sNew
Vision of FederalHabeas Corpusfor State Prisoners, 1989 Sup. CT. REV. 165 [hereinafter Hoffmann,
New Vision] (discussing the significance of Teague and the extensive changes it brought to federal
habeas review).
57. This allocation continued a tradition that had been established in the 1960s, when the lower
federal courts were essentially deputized by the Warren Court, by means of the Court's dramatic
expansion of federal habeas, to enforce often-unpopular new federal constitutional rules that defined
the so-called "criminal procedure revolution." See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 657 (1961) (holding
that the exclusionary rule is constitutionally required under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments);
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966) (holding that the criminal "accused must be adequately
and effectively apprised of his [privilege against self-incrimination] and the exercise of that privilege").
58. In the post-Gregg years from 1976 to 1991, more than 40% of all death sentences were
reversed on habeas. See JAMES S. LIEBMAN & RANDY HERTZ, FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE § 2.3, at 21-22 n.23 (3rd ed. 1998) (noting a habeas reversal rate of 42% between
1978 and 1984 and a habeas reversal rate of41% between 1985 and 1991; when unpublished decisions
are included, the reversal rate for the entire period (1978-1991) rises to 47%).
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(despite the traditional lawyer's view), even perfect procedures
cannot guarantee perfect results-which means that procedural law
may wind up being pushed beyond its proper limits. If a federal
judge, for instance, is disturbed by what he or she perceives to be
the wrong result in a capital case, and if the only way to reverse the
decision is to find a federal procedural error, then the judge will be
under severe, maybe insurmountable, pressure to find (or perhaps
manufacture?) such an error-even if, in the abstract, the procedures
used in the state courts were well within the range of reasonable
fairness.
In other words, a process-oriented solution for a
substantive problem can, if the matter is important enough to compel
judicial action, provoke an otherwise unwarranted expansion of
procedural law.
Second, given the first difficulty, the procedural law is likely
eventually to expand to the point where it substantially overregulates. The primary problem is that, every time a federal court
announces a new procedural rule for the purpose of overturning a
state death sentence with which the judge does not agree, the rule
does not disappear after the particular case is over-rather, it
becomes federal law that must be applied by other courts to other
cases. As the federal law becomes increasingly more complex,
procedural errors may be found in many cases even though all courts
would agree that the results of those cases were correct. In the
death-penalty context, habeas courts often deal with cases in which
the federal procedural rules were violated, but in which the result of
the proceeding was nevertheless correct, and in which reversal would
thus impinge on the values of federalism and comity without
producing a corresponding improvement in the basic justice of the
outcome. In such cases, habeas courts face severe pressure to devise
and apply curative methods (such as "harmless error" doctrines) to
preserve the correct result even in the face of a recognized violation
of federal procedural law. 9

In the early 1980s, the Court took the first in a series of steps to
ameliorate the over-reversal problem which threatened to derail the
administration of state death penalty systems the Court had upheld as
constitutional just a few years before. In Zant v. Stephens' and Barclay
v. Florida,6 the Court articulated a new Eighth Amendment "harmless
error" test for death sentencing. 2 Zant v. Stephens involved the recurring

59. Hoffmann, Is Innocence Sufficient?, supra note 27, at 825.
60. 462 U.S. 862 (1983).
61. 463 U.S. 939 (1983).
62. See generally Robert Weisberg, DeregulatingDeath, 1983 SUP. CT. REV. 305 (arguing that
the Supreme Court has essentially stopped regulating states' administration of the penalty phase of

capital murder trials).
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situation where one statutory aggravating circumstance in a case is held
invalid, but other valid aggravators remain.6' The Court held that, in a
state like Georgia where the statutory aggravating circumstances served
only as a threshold requirement, establishing eligibility for the death
penalty but not guiding the final sentencing decision, this situation did not
require reversal of the death sentence. 64
Barclay presented a similar situation, but in a different statutory
context, that of the Florida death penalty system, where statutory aggravators were not merely threshold requirements but served to guide the capital
sentencer throughout the decisionmaking process. There, the Court held
that harmlessness in capital sentencing could be established by the
reviewing court in much the same way as traditional "harmless error" in
the content of convictions at trial.6'
These harmless error rules ensured that at least some substantively
justifiable death sentences would not need to be reversed because of
procedural errors, but the practical effect was minimal. Few cases fit
within the narrow scope of Zant v. Stephens or Barclay v. Florida,l so
the Court was forced to turn elsewhere.
If a solution to the problem of over-reversal of state death penalty
cases could not be found within the Eighth Amendment itself, then perhaps
it could be found in greater regulation of the procedural mechanisms by
which Eighth Amendment claims were litigated. The primary such mechanism, of course, is federal habeas.67 So the Court began judicially
restricting access to federal habeas, even though, as a practical matter,
habeas review created few problems for the states in non-capital cases.
Beginning in the late 1970s, and accelerating rapidly in the 1980s and
early 1990s, the Court imposed numerous new procedural restrictions on
the ability of death row inmates (and all other state convicts) to use habeas
petitions to obtain review of federal constitutional claims.
These
procedural restrictions, announced in such cases as Wiinwright v. Sykes, 68

63. See id. at 347 (noting that although the Georgia Supreme Court previously struck down one
of the three statutory aggravating circumstances as unconstitutionally vague, it nevertheless held that
the death sentence could stand on the basis of the two other valid circumstances).
64. See Zant, 462 U.S. at 884-89.
65. See Barclay, 463 U.S. at 956-58 (holding that sentencing a defendant to death on the basis on
an improper statutory ground does not mandate reversal).
66. See Weisberg, supra note 62 at 358 ("If the Court discovers new disequilibrium in the death
penalty, there will be constitutional doctrine consistent with Zant and Barclaywhich the Court can use
in any effort at regulation.").
67. See Burt Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1105 (1977), for an explanation
of some of the structural reasons why most federal habeas courts are more aggressive in the defense
of federal constitutional rights than many state courts.
68. 433 U.S. 72, 87 (1977) (barring federal habeas review based on the failure to raise a claim
properly in state court absent a showing of cause and prejudice).
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Rose v. Lundy,69 Kuhlmann v. Wilson,7" Teague v. Lane,7 Butler v.
McKellar,' McCleskey v. Zant,73 and Brecht v. Abrahamson,74 barred
the federal courthouse doors to many otherwise meritorious federal constitutional claims in capital and non-capital cases alike.
Once again, however, the Court got into trouble because it insisted on
using a procedural solution (procedural habeas restrictions) to try to solve
a substantive problem (the over-reversal of substantively deserved death

sentences). The new habeas restrictions adopted by the Court barred the
doors not only to the many death row inmates whose death sentences were
substantively deserved, despite the possible presence of procedural error in

their cases, but also to the few death row inmates whose sentences, like
those of Lockett and Godfrey, were undeserved. To put it another way,
the Court's procedural habeas restrictions threatened to prevent habeas
courts from reaching and reversing even those few death sentences that
they might have viewed as substantively unjust.
As a result, the Court was forced to create a new substantive exception
to these new procedural habeas restrictions, and it did. In the late 1980s
75 Kuhlmann v.
and early 1990s, in such cases as Murray v. Carrier,
7
6
77
Wilson,
Smith v. Murray, McCleskey v. Zant,78 Coleman v.
79
Thompson, and Sawyer v. Whitley,' the Court created an exception to
almost every one of the new habeas restrictions based on proof that the
petitioner had suffered a "fundamental miscarriage of justice."" t This

69. 455 U.S. 509, 510 (1982) (requiring that state remedies be exhausted for all claims presented
for habeas review).
70. 477 U.S. 436, 454 (1986) (prohibiting successive federal habeas petitions absent some
colorable showing of factual innocence).
71. 489 U.S. 288, 311-12, 316 (1989) (holding that new constitutional decisions are not to be
applied retroactively in habeas proceedings absent a showing that the new rules place certain kinds of
primary, private conduct beyond the scope of criminal law or guarantee procedures implicit in a scheme
of ordered liberty).
72. 494 U.S. 407, 414-15 (1990) (announcing that the Teague rule applies whenever state courts
could have reasonably disagreed over the governing federal standard).
73. 499 U.S. 467, 493 (1991) (holding that the failure to raise a claim in a first federal habeas
petition constitutes an abuse of the writ in subsequent habeas claims absent a showing of cause and
prejudice).
74. 507 U.S. 619, 623 (1993) (applying the harmless error rule to habeas cases).
75. 477 U.S. 478, 495-96 (1986) (recognizing an exception to the procedural default doctrine).
76. 477 U.S. 436, 454 (1986) (recognizing an exception to the successive petition doctrine under
an "ends of justice" standard).
77. 477 U.S. 527, 537-38 (1986) (recognizing an exception to the procedural default doctrine).
78. 499 U.S. 467, 494-95 (1991) (recognizing an exception to the abuse-of-the-writ doctrine).
79. 501 U.S. 722, 750 (1991) (recognizing an exception to the procedural default doctrine).
80. 505 U.S. 333, 339-40 (1992) (recognizing an exception to the procedural default doctrine).
81. The only major habeas restriction for which the Court did not create an exception was the
retroactivity doctrine of Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989). See Ellen E. Boshkoff, Resolving
Retroactivity After Teague v. Lane, 65 IND. L.J. 651, 667-72 (1990) (arguing for the creation of a
"fundamental miscarriage of justice" exception to Teague's rule of non-retroactivity).
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substantive exception allowed habeas courts to invite back into the federal
courthouse the few death row inmates, as well as the few non-capital
convicts, whose cases involved both substantive and procedural errors.
For habeas petitioners raising claims of factual innocence, the
fundamental miscarriage of justice exception proved to be much more
significant in theory than in practice since almost no such petitioners
qualified for the exception.' In 1992, the Court also virtually ensured
that the exception would not apply to most claims by death row inmates
that their death sentences were undeserved. In Sawyer v. Whitley,' the
Court held that the exception applies to capital sentencing only if the
defendant can show by clear and convincing evidence that, absent the
alleged constitutional error, no reasonable juror would have found the
defendant eligible for the death penalty.' 4 Three years later, however, in
Schlup v. Delo,8 the Court held that the demanding Sawyer standard is
limited to capital sentencing cases and explained that the proper standard
in cases involving claims of factual innocence is simply whether "it is more
likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted" absent the
alleged constitutional error.'
By the early 1990s, the Court, now more conservative than before,
was no longer issuing many new Eighth Amendment procedural rulings in
favor of capital defendants. Moreover, as a result of the Court's 1989
habeas retroactivity decision in Teague v. Lane,' most of the few prodefense rulings that were made did not apply to habeas cases anyway and
therefore could not benefit capital habeas petitioners. 8 In addition, the
exceedingly narrow scope of the fundamental miscarriage of justice exception meant that many otherwise valid procedural claims were barred,
especially if a capital defendant's lawyers had defaulted the claim by failing
to raise it properly in state court. Despite these restrictions, however,
three categories of procedural claims remained generally available to capital
defendants in habeas.

82. See Evan Tsen Lee, The Theories of FederalHabeasCorpus, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 151, 207-08
(1994) (discussing the narrow scope of the exception).
83. 505 U.S. 333 (1992).
84. Id. at 336.
85. 513 U.S. 298 (1995).
86. Id. at 327.
87. 489 U.S. 288 (1989). See generally Hoffmann, New Vision, supra note 56 (discussing the
significance of Teague).
88. Teague and its progeny created exceptions to the non-retroactivity rule for (1) new decisions
that rendera priorconviction substantively, ratherthan procedurally, invalid, such as a decisionholding
that the underlying behavior cannot be criminalized, and (2) new decisions that establish a "watershed
role" of criminal procedure, "the kind of absolute prerequisite to fundamental fairness that is 'implicit
in the concept of ordered liberty.'" See Teague, 489 U.S. at 311-14 (quoting Mackey v. U.S., 401
U.S. 667, 693 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
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The first category involved procedural claims that had been properly
preserved by the capital defendant's lawyers in state court and that involved
so-called "mixed questions" of fact and law. Such mixed claims were
governed by a favorable de novo standard of review, which meant that the
habeas courts did not need to give any weight to the state court's prior
adjudication of the claim.8 9 In Wight v. West, 90 the State of Virginia
argued that this de novo standard was inappropriate, given that habeas
courts had long been required to defer to state-court findings of fact9 and
could not reverse state-court rulings based on erroneous legal interpretations unless those interpretations were "patently unreasonable" in light
of established federal legal precedents. 9 The Court in West declined to
adopt Virginia's proposed deferential standard for mixed issues in habeas
cases, although three of the Justices agreed with Virginia's argument. 93
It would be four years until Congress, in 1996, finally stepped in to limit
habeas relitigation of mixed questions.'
The second and third categories, while procedural in form, actually
represented disguised efforts to relitigate the substance of the case. The
second category involved claims that a capital defendant's lawyers had
rendered ineffective assistance of counsel in state court, violating the Sixth
Amendment.95 Any capital defendant whose lawyer had failed to preserve
some procedural claim in state court could try to salvage the defaulted
claim by arguing ineffective assistance of counsel. 96 Even defendants

89. SeeWrightv. West, 505 U.S. 277,301-03 (1992) (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment)
(arguing that the Court has often addressed the standard of review issue and has consistently applied
a de novo standard); Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 112 (1985) (stating that a question regarding the
constitutional manner in which a confession was obtained "is a matter for independent federal
determination"); Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 458, 463 (1953) (holding that a state court judgment
is "not res judicata" regarding federal habeas claims and that the federal court should determine
whether the state adjudication "has resulted in a satisfactory conclusion"); but see West, 505 U.S. at
289-90 (Thomas, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J. and Scalia, J., announcing the judgment of the Court)
(arguing that a de novo standard has never been directly adopted by the Court).
90. 505 U.S. 277 (1992).
91. See generally Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 313 (1963) (discussing factors that should lead
a habeas court to conduct a factual hearing, later codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1966)).
92. See Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407, 415 (1990) (defining "new" rule to include all rules
susceptible to debate among reasonable minds"); Teague, 489 U.S. at 301 (explaining that a "new"
rule subject to the non-retroactivity doctrine is one "not dictated by precedent existing at the time the
defendant's conviction became final"); Joseph L. Hoffmann & William J. Stuntz, Habeas After the
Revolution, 1993 SuP. CT. REV. 65, 115 (explaining generally how the Teague non-retroactivity
doctrine, as modified by Butler v. McKellar, effectively requires federal courts to defer to reasonable
state court interpretations of federal constitutional law).
93. See West, 505 U.S. at 291 (Thomas, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J. and Scalia, J., announcing
the judgment of the Court).
94. See infra notes 109-19 and accompanyifg text.
95. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
96. See, e.g., Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 374-75 (1986) (holding that a Sixth
Amendment claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is cognizable on habeas even though the defense
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without much of a procedural claim-such as those whose primary argu-

ment was simply that they should get a second opportunity to present a
better mitigation case at sentencing-could turn their essentially substantive

claim ("I don't deserve a death sentence") into a procedural one by
characterizing it as an ineffective assistance claim ("I would surely have
avoided the death penalty, or perhaps even have been found innocent, if
only my defense lawyer had done a better job at my trial and sentencing
hearing").'
The third category involved the converse of an ineffective assistance
claim-namely, the claim that the prosecutor was responsible for the
substantively unjust result by failing to disclose material exculpatory

evidence in violation of due process and Brady v. Maryland.9"

Once

again, this exception provided capital defendants with a chance to seek a
second sentencing hearing or trial by turning an essentially substantive
claim ("I don't deserve a death sentence") into a procedural one ("I would

surely have avoided the death penalty, or perhaps even have been found
innocent, if only the prosecutor had not kept material evidence hidden from
my lawyer and the factfinder"). Any doubt about the potential value of
this kind of claim to capital defendants was eliminated when the Court
granted review, and ultimately reversed the defendant's conviction, in

Kyles v. Whitley, 99 a case noteworthy because it fell within none of the
Court's previously recognized parameters for a grant of certiorari."l°
What about death row inmates who believed that their sentences or
convictions were substantively unjust, yet could not identify any federal
constitutional procedural errors-not even ineffective assistance or Brady
violations-in their cases? Since the fundamental miscarriage of justice
exception did not itself create a separate constitutional claim but only

lawyer's alleged error consisted of a failure to raise a Fourth Amendment claim properly in an earlier
state proceeding).
97. See, e.g., T. Williams v. Taylor, 120 S. Ct. 1495 (2000) [hereinafter T. Williams v. Taylor]
(reversing a death sentence based on ineffective assistance of counsel where the defendant's lawyers
did not investigate or present substantial mitigating evidence to the sentencing jury).
98. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
99. 514 U.S. 419, 421-22, 441, 454 (1995) (finding, on habeas review, that the prosecutor's
failure to disclose eyewitnesses' statements that would have substantially weakened the prosecution's
case raised a reasonable probability that disclosure would have produced a different result; thus, a new
trial was in order).
100. See id. at456 (Scalia, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and Kennedy & Thomas, JJ., dissenting)
("The greatest puzzle of today's decision is what could have caused this capital case to be singled out
for favored treatment."). But see id. at 454 (Stevens, J., joined by Ginsburg & Breyer, JJ.,
concurring) ("Even aside from its legal importance, however, this case merits 'favored treatment
The Court has recently signaled that Kyles v. Whitley should not be read to create a new Brady
standard that would be more favorable to death row inmates. In Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263
(1999), the Court rejected a claim that undisclosed evidence that could have been used to impeach a
key prosecution witness in a capital trial was "material" under Brady.
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provided a means of salvaging some other constitutional claim that otherwise would have been barred, would a petitioner presenting a "naked
innocence" claim be able to obtain habeas review and possibly relief?.
This was precisely the question posed by Herrera v. Collins.'' In
Herrera, the defendant premised his habeas petition on allegedly newly
discovered evidence of his innocence, evidence that emerged too late to be
introduced by means of an appeal or state post-conviction proceeding.,'
Herrera argued that it would violate due process, in the substantive sense,
for the state to execute someone who might be innocent. 3 A majority
of the Court agreed in theory, but found no merit in Herrera's claim
because the new evidence was so weak.' °4 Herrera was executed shortly
thereafter. 05
By 1995, then, only a few broad categories of procedural claims-

namely, mixed questions, ineffective assistance claims, and Brady claimsheld out any meaningful hope for most death row inmates seeking to challenge their convictions or sentences in habeas. The good news for such
habeas petitioners was that the Court, in such cases as Wright v. Wst,1' 6
Kyles v. Whitley,"° and Schlup v. Delo,0 8 had shown itself unwilling
to restrict habeas any further, preferring to preserve the ability of habeas
courts to use procedural claims to reach and remedy the rare case of
substantive injustice. The bad news, however, was that the other shoe was
about to drop.
Enter Congress. In the wake of the Oklahoma City terrorist bombing,
Congress enacted, and President Clinton signed into law, the Antiterrorism

101. 506 U.S. 390 (1993).
102. Id. at 396-97, 400 (basing an actual innocence habeas claim on affidavits, inadmissible in
Texas state courts due to procedural time limits, averring that the recently deceased brother of the
convict had committed the crime).
103. Id. at 398 ("Petitioner asserts that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments... prohibit the
execution of a person who is innocent of the crime for which he was convicted.").
104. See id. at 417 (noting that even if the Court were to assume that a persuasive demonstration
of actual innocence would make an execution unconstitutional, the defendant's evidence fell far short
of the high threshold that would be required).
105. See Death by Injection for Cop Killer; Alleged Proofof Innocence Too Late to Save Texas
Man, CHI. TRIB., May 13, 1993, at 11, availablein 1993 WL 11069991.
106. 505 U.S. 277 (1992). A majority of the Court refused to modify the presumed de novo
standard of review for mixed question habeas cases. See supra notes 89-93 and accompanying text
(discussing the standards of review for mixed questions of fact and law).
107. 514 U.S. 419, 440-41 (1995) (granting a habeas petition in a capital case where the
cumulative effect of state-suppressed evidence raised a reasonable probability that its disclosure would
have produced a different result at trial); see supra notes 98-100 and accompanying text (describing
evidence suppression claims).
108. 513 U.S. 298, 324, 327 (1995) (holding that the proper standard in actual innocence claims
for capital cases is that it is "more likely than not" that a constitutional violation has resulted in an
erroneous conviction, and refusing to apply the "clear and convincing" standard of Murray v. Carrier,
477 U.S. 478 (1986)); see supra notes 82-86 and accompanying text (describing the evolution of
standards for actual innocence claims).
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and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), °9 which contained
the most significant habeas reforms since 1867. AEDPA was designed to
make habeas review and relief even less freely available than it had become
as a result of the Court's decisions."' Among other reforms, AEDPA
implemented (1) a one-year statute of limitations on the filing of a first
habeas petition;"' (2) new and severe restrictions on all second and
subsequent petitions;1 2 and, most significantly, (3) a new
"reasonableness" standard of review, similar to the one rejected by the
Court in Wight v. West, for all habeas claims, including "mixed
questions. "113 AEDPA also created a completely separate and even more
restrictive form of habeas for capital cases, applicable in any state that

chose to implement certain special opt-in procedures, most notably a
statewide system for guaranteeing capital defendants qualified and experienced counsel in all state post-conviction proceedings."'
The expressed goal of AEDPA was to end prolonged habeas litigation
in capital cases. However, in the first few habeas cases to reach the Court
under the new statute, the Court proved quite resourceful at keeping the
door of the federal courthouse open to habeas petitioners, at least a crack.

In each of these early AEDPA cases-Felker v. Turpin, "1 Calderon v.
Thompson," 6 Stewart v. Martinez-Villareal,"7 and Hohn v. United
States"'-the Court rejected the government's claim that AEDPA completely bars habeas review and relief. Instead, the Court emphasized the

109. Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (codified as amended in scattered titles of U.S.C.
(Supp. IV 1998)).
110. See, e.g., President William J. Clinton, Statement on Signing the Antiterrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act of 1996, (Apr. 24, 1996), in 1996 PUB. PAPERS 630, 631 (1996) ("I have long
sought to streamline Federal appeals for convicted criminals sentenced to the death penalty. For too
long, and in too many cases, endless death row appeals have stood in the way of justice being
served.").
111. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1) (Supp. IV 1998).
112. See id. § 2244(b) (requiring (1) the dismissal of all claims in successive habeas applications
that were raised in a previous application and (2) creating a presumption of dismissal of all new claims
in successive applications with three narrow exceptions).
113. Seeid. §2254(d)(1) (allowing federal courts to grant habeas applications on behalf of persons
in custody pursuant to a state court judgment only when the claim resulted in a decision contrary to
clearly established federal law as determined by the Supreme Court).
114. See AEDPA § 107(a), 28 U.S.C. § 2261(a)-(c) (Supp. IV 1998).
115. 518 U.S. 651, 660-61 (1996) (stating that while AEDPA precludes certiorari review of a
circuit court's denial of permission to file successive habeas petitions, a petitioner can still file an
original habeas petition in the Supreme Court seeking review of his case).
116. 523 U.S. 538, 553-54 (1998) (holding that a circuit court may, under certain circumstances,
recall its own mandate sua sponte and grant habeas relief where such relief would otherwise be barred
by AEDPA's successive-petition rule).
117. 523 U.S. 637, 644 (1998) (holding AEDPA's successive-petition rule inapplicable to a
petitioner whose earlier habeas petition was dismissed because his claim was then premature).
118. 524 U.S. 236,253 (1998) (holding that the Supreme Court hasjurisdiction to review a circuit
court's denial of a certificate of appealability).
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need to preserve habeas jurisdiction, if only to provide the federal courts
with a means of reaching and remedying the rare case of substantive
injustice." 9
In two very recent AEDPA decisions, Slack v.
McDaniel' ° and Michael Williams v. Taylor,'2 1 the Court likewise
rejected government suggestions that the statute be interpreted to preclude
habeas petitioners from obtaining federal review of their claims.
In the most significant case to date under AEDPA, Terry Williams v.
Taylor,"2 the Court addressed the proper construction of section
2254(d)(1) of the Act, which provides that a habeas court may grant relief
to a petitioner only if the state court's adjudication of the petitioner's claim
(1) "was contrary to," or (2) "involved an unreasonable application of,"
clearly established federal law as determined by the Court." This was
the provision intended by Congress to reverse the Court's decision in
Wright v. West, 24 which had held that habeas courts need not defer to
state-court decisions on mixed issues involving the application of federal
law to the facts of a particular case. In Terry Williams a narrow majority
of the Court held that section 2254(d)(1) makes it more difficult than
before for habeas petitioners to obtain relief based on such claims:
The term "unreasonable" is no doubt difficult to define. That said,
it is a common term in the legal world and, accordingly, federal
judges are familiar with its meaning. For purposes of today's
opinion, the most important point is that an unreasonableapplication
of federal law is different from an incorrect application of federal
law ...
Under § 2254(d)(1)'s "unreasonable application" clause,
then, a federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because
that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant
state-court decision applied clearly established federal law
erroneously or incorrectly. Rather that application must also be
unreasonable. '2

119. See generally LIEBMAN & HERTZ, supra note 58, § 3.2, at 115-18 ("T]he Court has
demonstrated a willingness to use its interpretive powers to moderate restrictions apparently effected
by AEDPA and, in situations in which AEDPA undeniably cuts off review, to establish or reaffirm the
continuing vitality of alternative means of judicial review to rectify serious systemic malfunctions.").
120. 120 S. Ct. 1595 (2000) (holding that (1) under AEDPA, the denial of habeas relief by a
federal district court may be appealed not only on constitutional grounds, but also on non-constitutional
federal grounds, and (2) AEDPA's general prohibition on "second or successive" habeas petitions does
not apply when the initial petition was dismissed without adjudication on the merits because of the
petitioner's failure to exhaust state remedies).
121. 120 S. Ct. 1479 (2000) (adopting the petitioner's interpretation of AEDPA's prohibition on
evidentiary hearings in habeas whenever the petitioner "failed to develop the factual basis of a claim"
in state court, so that review is not denied unless there was a lack of diligence, or some greater fault,
attributable to the petitioner or his counsel). On the same day, the Court also decided an unrelated but
identically named AEDPA case, T. Williams v. Taylor, 120 S. Ct. 1495 (2000).
122. 120 S. Ct. 1495 (2000).
123. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (Supp. IV 1998).
124. 505 U.S. 277 (1992).
125. T. Williams, 120 S. Ct. at 1522 (O'Connor, J., delivering the opinion of the Court with
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At the same time, the Court rejected the government's argument that
section 2254(d)(1) permits habeas relief only when the federal court
determines that the state court has applied federal law "in a manner that
reasonable jurists would all agree is unreasonable," 6 holding instead
that under section 2254(d)(1) the habeas court should simply ask whether
the state court's judgment was "objectively unreasonable." " The Court
proceeded to reverse petitioner Williams's conviction, even under
AEDPA's tougher standard of review, because his lawyer had clearly rendered constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel and it was therefore
unreasonable for the state court to have concluded otherwise."
Among the Court's AEDPA decisions, however, perhaps the most
interesting for present purposes was the convoluted procedural saga of
Edwards v. Carpenter. 9 In Carpenter, the petitioner pled guilty to
murder and robbery despite maintaining his innocence, and his convictions
were affirmed on appeal. Later, the petitioner-represented by new
counsel-filed an application in state court to reopen his appeal, contending
that his original appellate lawyer had been constitutionally ineffective for
failing to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his
convictions. The state court dismissed the application as untimely. In
federal habeas, the petitioner argued that his original appellate lawyer's
ineffectiveness was "cause" sufficient (if accompanied by a showing of
"prejudice") to excuse the procedural default of his sufficiency-of-theevidence claim. The Court agreed that such an ineffectiveness claim could
satisfy the "cause" requirement-but only if such claim was not procedurally defaulted in its own right, or if such procedural default was, in turn,
excused by its own showing of "cause and prejudice." The mere fact that
the petitioner had raised his ineffectiveness claim in his application to
reopen his appeal-at a stage when the applicable state procedural rules
precluded the state court from reaching the merits of the claim-was
insufficient, in the Court's view, to overcome the preclusive effects of the
procedural default doctrine.
Carpenter represents the apex, for now, of the Court's pyramid of
excessive proceduralism in habeas law. Justice Breyer's opinion concurring in the judgment perhaps said it best:
Although the question [presented in this case], like the majority's
opinion, is written with clarity, few lawyers, let alone unrepresented

respect to Part II, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (emphasis in original).
126. Id. at 1521 (quoting Green v. French, 143 F.3d 865, 870 (4th Cir. 1998), in which the
Fourth Circuit adopted the position advocated by the government in T. Williams).
127. Id. at 1521.
128. Id. at 1516 (Stevens, J., announcing the judgment of the Court and delivering the opinion
of the Court with respect to Parts I, III, and IV, and an opinion with respect to Parts II and V).
129. 120 S. Ct. 1587 (2000).
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state prisoners, will readily understand it. The reason lies in the
complexity of this Court's habeas corpus jurisprudence-a complexity
that in practice can deny the fundamental constitutional protection
that habeas corpus seeks to assure. Today's decision unnecessarily
adds to that complexity .... 130
Justice Breyer also grudgingly acknowledged that "this system of rules has
a certain logic, indeed an attractive power for those who like difficult
3
puzzles." '
In the end, despite all of the attempts by the Court and Congress to
read the habeas writ into oblivion, habeas survives. The real question,
however, is whether habeas survives in the proper form. The endless and
vicious cycle of excessive proceduralism, which began as a direct result of
Furman, Gregg, and the post-Gregg "super due process" interpretation of
the Eighth Amendment, continues to plague the law of habeas, as evidenced by cases like Edwards v. Carpenter. If habeas is truly to be saved, if
it is to continue to perform its historic role of preventing substantive
injustice, then the cycle must be broken. Substance must become the
primary focus of habeas review in capital cases.
III. The Importance of Substantive Review in Capital Habeas Cases
The cycle of excessive proceduralism in habeas corpus law, which (as
I have explained) is largely a by-product of the Court's procedural
interpretation of the Eighth Amendment, is not merely a matter of academic interest. In the all-too-real world of capital litigation, this cycle has
contributed to serious practical problems that threaten to undermine the
very foundations of some state capital punishment systems.
The primary practical problem with federal habeas corpus in death
penalty cases today is that habeas courts are limited to dealing with
procedural issues. Although such issues are important, they should properly be seen as secondary, especially in capital cases, to the overriding
importance of ensuring that substantive justice is done. It is intolerable for
a habeas court reviewing a state death penalty case to be unable to consider
directly the possibility of the defendant's factual innocence or the sense that
the defendant, even though guilty, does not deserve to die for his
crime; 32 yet this is the way it is.

130. Id. at 1593 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment).
131. Id. at 1595.
132. See Shigemitsu Dando, Toward the Abolition of the Death Penalty, 72 IND. L.J. 7, 13-16
(1996) (providing a reviewing judge's sentiments when faced with the possibility that a convicted
defendant facing execution might be factually innocent, but not being allowed to grant a retrial under
governing standards).
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Current events highlight this shocking defect. The recent, highly
publicized revelations about substantive errors in the application of the
death penalty in Illinois not only have led the governor of that state to
suspend all executions pending a comprehensive review of the Illinois
capital punishment system,'33 but also have prompted introduction of at
least five bills in Congress designed to ensure that death row inmates have
access to, and can introduce in court, DNA evidence that might establish
their factual or legal innocence.134
The issue of post-trial admissibility of DNA evidence, however, is
only one specific example of a general and extremely troubling problem.
There is something seriously wrong with our legal system when it takes
federal legislation to authorize reviewing courts to consider probative
evidence of a death row inmate's innocence. Such authority should be a
given in virtually any civilized system of justice. Moreover, why should
such authority be limited to the narrow category of DNA evidenceshouldn't any sufficiently probative evidence of innocence be equally
admissible?
Finally, why should the reviewing court's substantive
consideration of a death penalty case be limited to the sole issue of guilt or
innocence-why shouldn't the court also consider whether the death penalty
is morally justified on the facts of the particular case? The proposed
federal DNA legislation has already garnered substantial bipartisan support,
'35but does not go nearly far enough to ensure substantive justice in death
penalty cases.
Our entire criminal justice system seems implicitly premised on the
belief that perfect procedures can guarantee substantively perfect outcomes.
For example, in Herrera v. Collins,'36 the aforementioned case involving
a capital habeas petitioner with a "naked innocence" claim, Justice
O'Connor acknowledged that the execution of a "legally and factually
innocent person would be a constitutionally intolerable event." 13 7 But she
asserted that the Court need not be deeply concerned about such an
unthinkable problem, because it will probably never happen:
[T]he Court has no reason to pass on, and appropriately reserves, the
question whether federal courts may entertain convincing claims of
actual innocence. That difficult question remains open. If the

133. See Ken Armstrong & Steve Mills, Ryan: "Until I Can Be Sure"; Illinois is First State to
Suspend Death Penalty, CI. TRIB., Feb. 1, 2000, at 1, availablein 2000 WL 3632094.
134. See Accuracy in Judicial Administration Act, H.R. 3623, H.R. 4162, 106th Cong. (2000);
Innocence Protection Act, S. 2073, H.R. 4078, H.R. 4167, 106th Cong. (2000).
135. See Mike Doming, Death Penalty Reforms Gain Backers in D.C., CI. TRIB., Mar. 31,
2000, at 1, availablein 2000 WL 3651265 (reporting on bipartisan support for proposed federal DNA
legislation).
136. 506 U.S. 390 (1993).
137. Id. at 419 (O'Connor, J., joined by Kennedy, J., concurring).
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Constitution's guarantees of fair procedure and the safeguards of
clemency and pardon fulfill their historical mission, it may never
require resolution at all."'
Such blind faith in the substantive effectiveness of perfect procedures
is absolutely mystifying and can be downright deadly for death row
inmates. Recent developments in Illinois and elsewhere suggest that

substantive mistakes, even in capital cases, are much more commonplace
than previously suspected. " Although it would be comforting to be able
to say that such mistakes are always the result of someone's reversible
procedural misconduct, like the prosecutor's or the police's, surely it is
also possible for such mistakes to be simply the product of an honest

factual-or, in the case of capital sentencing, moral-misjudgment by the
jury or trial judge. Why is it so hard for us to admit that factfinders and
sentencers-being human, and thus fallible-sometimes make mistakes, just
like prosecutors and police do?'1°
Once one admits the possibility of substantive error that is not
attributable to reversible procedural misconduct, the nature of the problem
becomes clear. Most capital cases do not involve substantive error-the
defendant is in fact guilty, and, as measured by the moral standards of the
community, deserves to die. If constitutional procedural error occurs in
such cases, and if such error has been properly preserved for review, then
it should of course be corrected.' 4' The current system of habeas review

is, in theory, designed to do exactly that. 42
But what of those capital cases involving substantive error-where the
defendant is, in fact, innocent, or where (again, as measured by the
community's moral standards) the defendant, even though guilty, does not
deserve to die? Fortunately for the defendant, in some such cases,

138. Id. at 427 (O'Connor, J., joined by Kennedy, J., concurring).
139. See Death Row Justice Derailed, CH. TRIB., Nov. 14, 1999, at 1, available in 1999 WL
2932178 (reporting on mistaken convictions in Illinois death penalty cases). See generally Leigh B.
Bienen, The Quality of Justicein CapitalCases: Illinois as a Case Study, 61 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
193 (1998) (examining the quality of appellate review of death penalty cases in Illinois).
140. Americans seem to need to believe in the infallibility of the jury. This belief, based on faith
rather than empirical evidence, seems to be one form of American "civic religion." See Frank E.
Reynolds, Dhamma in Dispute: The Interactionsof Religion and Law in Thailand,28 L. & SOc. REV.
433,441 (1994) (discussing the general concept of "civic religion"); Joseph L. Hoffmann, "Truth" and
the JapaneseCode of CriminalProcedure, 1148 JURISTO 178 (1999) (special issue of a leading Japanese
law journal honoring the 50th anniversary of the Japanese Code of Criminal Procedure) (contrasting
the Japanese belief in "factual truth," that the legal system can always uncover an objectively true
factual account of what happened, with the American belief in "legal truth," that whatever "truth"
emerges from a legitimate legal proceeding, especially the version of the "truth" spoken by the jury,
is sufficient).
141. Cf. Stephen B. Bright, Is FairnessIrrelevant?:The Evisceration of FederalHabeas Corpus
Review and Limits on the Ability of State Courts to ProtectFundamentalRights, 54 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 1, 15 (1997) (noting that process, as well as substance, matters).
142. But see id. at 28-31 (describing cases in which courts declined to remedy procedural errors).
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properly preserved procedural error also clearly exists, perhaps even as the
cause of the substantive error. Again, the current habeas system is
designed to deal, albeit indirectly, with the substantive problems in these
kinds of cases.
The current habeas system provides no solution at all, however, for
capital cases involving possible substantive error in the absence of clear
and properly preserved procedural error. In cases such as Herrera v.
Collins4 3 (in the context of guilt determinations) and Lockett v. Ohio"4
and Godfrey v. Georgia4" (in the context of capital sentencing decisions),
only two things can happen-and both of them are bad. One possibility is
that the habeas court, faced with a persuasive claim of substantive injustice,
strains to find a constitutional procedural error sufficient to reverse the
conviction or death sentence, thereby contributing to the subsequent overreversal of other death penalty cases and perpetuating the cycle of
excessive proceduralism described above. The other, more horrific possibility is that the habeas court is compelled, in the absence of clear
procedural error, to affirm the defendant's conviction and death sentence,
thus allowing a possibly innocent defendant, or one deserving only a life
sentence, to be executed.
What is sorely needed is a reinterpretation of the Eighth Amendment
that places substantive limits on the imposition of the death penalty in
individual cases.
As was originally urged in Herrera, the Eighth
Amendment should be reinterpreted to require that the imposition of the
death penalty is based not only on a procedurally valid guilty verdict at
trial, but also on the continuing moral certainty-at every stage of the posttrial proceedings-that the defendant is, in fact, guilty. "4 Moreover, as
was argued more than twenty years ago in Lockett and Godfrey, the Eighth
Amendment should further be reinterpreted to require the imposition of the
death penalty in every individual capital case to be consistent with the
moral standards of the community. "
Such a proposal-which would likely require action by both the Court
and Congress to implement' 4 8-would force federal habeas courts to

143. 506 U.S. 390 (1993) (holding that a death row inmate's claim of innocence did not entitle
him to federal habeas relief).
144. 438 U.S. 586 (1978) (holding that the limited range of mitigating circumstances a sentencing
court could consider under the Ohio death penalty statute was incompatible with the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments).
145. 446 U.S. 420 (1980) (holding that the Georgia Supreme Court's broad construction of the
state's death penalty statute violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments).
146. See Herrera,506 U.S. at 431-35 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("The protection of the Eighth
Amendment does not end once a defendant has been validly convicted and sentenced.").
147. See Lockett, 438 U.S. at 604-05; Godfrey, 446 U.S. at 428-29.
148. AEDPA's new "reasonableness" standard of review for mixed fact-and-law claims and
limitations on the power of habeas courts to conduct evidentiary hearings would block meaningful
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review the merits of every individual death sentence. 49 In order to
uphold the death sentence, each court sitting in habeas would have to
conclude, to a moral certainty, that the defendant is guilty. Each habeas
court would also have to conclude, to its own moral satisfaction, that the
defendant's death sentence is deserved because it is consistent with the
community's moral standards. These two substantive tests would apply
independently of any constitutional procedural issues that also might be
present in the particular case.
Four important aspects of this proposal must be emphasized. First,
the substantive review contemplated would differ from the "proportionality
review" contained in some state death penalty statutes.150 Proportionality
review generally compares an individual capital case with one or more
similar cases from the same jurisdiction to determine whether the instant
death sentence is consistent with the results in the other similar cases. The
current proposal, on the other hand, asks the habeas court to make its own
determination about whether the individual death sentence is deserved in
terms of prevailing community norms. Such a determination might take
into account results in other similar capital cases, but it need not. The
habeas court could simply decide for itself whether the death penalty is
morally justified in the particular case itself, so long as the court's decision
is based on its view of the community's moral standards rather than on its
own personal moral views.
Second, the proposal would require habeas courts to make fact-specific
judgments that would be difficult, if not impossible, to distill into legal
rules. Indeed, in my view, it would be unwise even to attempt to derive
such rules from the substantive outcomes of individual death penalty habeas
cases.
Long ago, in Furman,the Supreme Court succumbed to the temptation
to compel quasi-codification of the myriad factors that make the death
penalty appropriate or inappropriate in specific cases. As Justice Harlan
predicted in McGuatha, this effort has failed, in two important ways. On
one hand, it has failed to produce the desired rationality and predictability
in death sentencing; on the other hand, it has largely deprived the jury's
capital sentencing decision of its proper character as a fundamentally
irreducible and personal moral judgment.
In the words of Robert
Weisberg:

substantive review, even if the Court were to reinterpret the Eighth Amendment in the manner
suggested.
149. The proposal, because it is based on the reinterpretation of the Eighth Amendment, would
also require state appellate and post-conviction courts to conduct similar substantive review on direct
appeal and in state post-conviction proceedings; but this effect is beyond the scope of both this Article
and this Symposium.
150. See, e.g., Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37 (1984).
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Harlan's famous statement that a comprehensive and intelligible death
penalty law is beyond human ability bears careful reading in the
context of the whole opinion. Harlan does not say that a jury's
[discretionary] decision to kill is inevitably irrational. He says with
some confidence as jurors face so obviously awesome a decision they
will naturally act with appropriate moral seriousness, guided by at
least intuitive moral rationality. Harlan says that we cannot mitigate
our inevitable moral ambivalence about condemning people to death
by dignifying our decision in the illusory language of legal science.
. . . Once we recognize moral choice as more art than science, we

can achieve a reasonable amount of harmony and consistency in the
course of our moral choices, so that at least in retrospect we can say
that we have acted in some sense "rationally."
The call for
something more reassuring-a verifiable formula of moral decision
that prescribes future choices-comes not from moral philosophy, but
from the need of "public order" for political symbols of rationality.
...

The development of the formal model, at least in the long run,

suppresses more than it answers the moral and political questions that
ought to be addressed before we execute people.'5
Having already allowed jurors to hide their moral ambivalence about
the death penalty behind the comforting language of law, we must not
make the same mistake twice. Habeas judges, in their substantive review
of death sentences, must not be permitted to resort to "legal science" to
avoid confronting the terrible truth of the moral judgments they are being
asked to make. They must grapple with the thorny "moral and political
questions" that underlie each capital sentencing decision. They should
strive to stand in the shoes of society at large, setting aside personal
idiosyncrasies in favor of a more objective judgment based on an interpretation of the community's moral standards. But, in the end, what is
most crucial is for habeas judges to act with "appropriate moral seriousness, guided by . . . intuitive moral rationality."' 52 Legal rules can only

get in the way of such moral judgments. Although such a moral responsibility does not now rest upon the shoulders of habeas courts, there are
good reasons to place it there. Perhaps the best reason is that habeas
courts seem to be in the best position to fulfill this responsibility. For one
thing, federal judges are not elected, unlike most of their state counterparts, and therefore are not subject to the political pressures that make it
difficult for state judges to reverse convictions or sentences in capital
cases. 153

151. Weisberg, supra note 62, at 312, 395.
152. Id. at 312.
153. See Stephen B. Bright & Patrick J. Keenan, Judges and the Politics of Death: Deciding
Between the Bill of Rights and the Next Election in CapitalCases, 75 B.U. L. REV. 759,776-79 (1995)
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More importantly, recent empirical research reveals that the legal
actors who now make all of the key substantive decisions in capital casesnamely, the juries who convict capital defendants and recommend or
impose their death sentences-do not always feel appropriately morally
responsible for the outcome of the cases." 5 They often assume that (1)
the law compels them to render a particular sentencing verdict (they make
this assumption even in the face of contrary jury instructions), (2) the trial
judge shares moral responsibility for the outcome, or (3) state and federal
appellate and habeas courts will ensure that any mistakes they make will
be corrected later. 55 The jury can easily make these assumptions
because its role is performed at the very beginning of the capital case-in
point of fact, there will typically be many levels of judicial review after the
jury has completed its task, even if none of those reviews will revisit the
substantive justice of the jury's conviction and sentencing decision.
Habeas courts, on the other hand, know that there is nowhere else for
a capital case to go; once a death sentence makes it past the habeas courts,
only an executive pardon or clemency will keep the defendant from being
executed. Thus, of all the legal actors in a capital case, habeas courts are
the most likely to take seriously their own moral responsibility to ensure
that no innocent or life-deserving defendant is subjected to the ultimate
punishment. 156
Third, it is also important to note that the substantive review this
proposal contemplates would not be limited solely to the evidence presented
at trial, but would include any new evidence that might be introduced
during the habeas proceeding. Of course, each habeas court would have
to decide whether to allow the introduction of new evidence based on that

(noting that in 42 states, and in 32 of the 38 states with the death penalty, state judges must stand for
election or retention).
154. See generally Joseph L. Hoffmann, Where's the Buck?-JurorMisperceptionsof Sentencing
Responsibility in Death Penalty Cases, 70 IND. L. J. 1137, 1155-60 (1995) [hereinafter Hoffmann,
Where's the Buck?], (discussing empirical research indicating thatdeath penalty juries seek to avoid the
perception that they bear personal responsibility for their decision by convincing themselves they are
choiceless).
155. See Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 328-29 (1985) (holding that a death sentence may
not rest on the determination of a jury that has been misled by the prosecutor about the extent of their
sentencing responsibility); William J. Bowers, The Capital Jury Project: Rationale, Design, and
Preview of Early Findings, 70 IND. L.J. 1043 (1995); Hoffmann, Where's the Buck?, supra note 154
(discussing the findings of the Capital Jury Project); Austin Sarat, Violence, Representation, and
Responsibility in Capital Trials: The View from the Jury, 70 IND. L.J. 1103 (1995) (reporting findings
from the Capital Jury Project).
156. One possible negative side effect that should be mentioned is that the proposed substantive
review of death penalty cases by habeas courts may further diminish the jury's sense of moral

responsibility for its sentencing verdict. This may not be a big problem, however, for two reasons.
First, as noted previously, capital juries often manage to avoid such feelings of moral responsibility
even in the absence of substantive habeas review. Second, and more importantly, if the overriding goal
is to provide for meaningful substantive review of death penalty cases at some point in the review
process, then a further diminution of the jury's role would be a relatively small price to pay.
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court's considered judgment about the likelihood of such new evidence
affecting the application of the two substantive tests. If, for example, the
habeas court felt new evidence about the crime such as DNA evidence
would help resolve the defendant's guilt or innocence, then the court could
hold an evidentiary hearing. Similarly, if the habeas court felt new
evidence on aggravation and mitigation would help determine the deservedness of the defendant's death sentence, the court could permit the
introduction of such new evidence.
Moreover, as a general matter, we should not allow habeas procedural
restrictions to stand in the way of ensuring substantive justice in capital
cases. The procedural default doctrine, for example, which holds habeas
petitioners responsible for most procedural errors of their lawyers," 7
seems inappropriately harsh when applied to substantive review of a capital
case. Only in the rare situation where a defendant has made a fully
informed and voluntary choice to bypass a fair opportunity to present a
claim of substantive injustice to the state courts should the habeas courts
subsequently decline to review such a claim. 5 Likewise, the exhaustion

doctrine'5 9 should not apply to substantive claims in capital cases. Nor

should the successive-petition" or abuse-of-the-writ' 6' doctrines apply
to such claims, although of course the fact that an earlier habeas court has
rejected a particular substantive claim should, on the merits, discourage a

157. See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 87 (1977) (barring federal habeas review based on
a defendant's failure to raise a claim properly in state court absent a showing of "cause" for the
procedural default and "prejudice" resulting therefrom).
158. Such a standard would be similar to the "deliberate bypass" standard for the review of
constitutional claims set forth in Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963):
We therefore hold that the federal habeas judge may in his discretion deny relief to an
applicant who has deliberately by-passed the orderly procedure of the state courts and in
so doing has forfeited his state court remedies. . . . If a habeas applicant, after
consultation with competent counsel or otherwise, understandingly and knowingly
forewent the privilege of seeking to vindicate his federal claims in the state courts,
whether for strategic, tactical, or any other reasons that can fairly be described as the
deliberate by-passing of state procedures, then it is open to the federal court on habeas to
deny him all relief if the state courts refused to entertain his federal claims on the meritsthough of course only after the federal court has satisfied itself, by holding a hearing or
by some other means, of the facts bearing upon the applicant's default.
Id. at 438-39. Fay v. Noia was overruled by Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 87 (1977) (replacing
the "deliberate bypass" standard with the "cause" and "prejudice" standard in the context of failure
to raise a claim in an earlier state proceeding), and Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750 (1991)
(same holding, in the context of failure to file a state-court appeal at all). See also Keeney v. TamayoReyes, 504 U.S. 1, 5-8 (1992) (same holding, in the related context of failure to develop the facts
necessary to support a claim in an earlier state proceeding).
159. See Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 510 (1982) (requiring that state remedies be exhausted
for all claims presented for habeas review).
160. See Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 454 (1986) (prohibiting successive federal habeas
petitions absent some colorable showing of factual innocence).
161. See McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 493 (1991) (holding that the failure to raise a claim
in a first federal habeas petition constitutes an abuse of the writ in subsequent habeas claims absent a
showing of cause and prejudice).
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later habeas court from engaging in protracted review of the same claim.
The point is that, at the end of the day, the habeas court needs to be
in a position to make an informed decision about the substantive justice of
each defendant's conviction and death sentence, based on a review of all
available facts and circumstances. The habeas court should be morally
responsible for ensuring that each individual death sentence is imposed
upon a defendant who is actually guilty and deserves to die. This is the
least we should expect before allowing a state to execute one of its citizens.
A fourth and final point worth emphasizing is that my proposal would
be limited to capital habeas cases only. That the same kind of substantive
problem may also exist in non-capital cases is true, but beside the point.
No matter how wrong it may be to keep a prisoner in custody when he
may be innocent or to keep him beyond the time he deserves, such injustices pale in comparison to the horror of a substantively wrongful
execution. Both supporters and opponents of capital punishment should be
able to agree that a wrongful execution is the single worst injustice our
legal system is capable of inflicting.
As a legal matter, the Eighth Amendment certainly permits
distinguishing between direct habeas review of substantive issues in capital
and non-capital cases. The Supreme Court has long recognized, in terms
of Eighth Amendment procedural issues, that "death is different," meaning
that the irrevocability of the death penalty sometimes requires that special
procedures be employed to minimize the risk of substantive error. 62 The
same argument, that "death is different," can be made even more forcefully when the issue involves substance directly. Substantive Eighth
Amendment habeas review is a special protection that need not be extended
to non-capital convictions or sentences.
Would substantive Eighth Amendment habeas review of death sentences infringe on states' rights? Would federalism stand in the way of
such an otherwise desirable proposal? I think not. Frankly, it is hard to
imagine how any review system could disrupt state prerogatives more than
the current procedural mess of capital habeas litigation. The states spend
millions of dollars litigating each capital case to execution, 63 and for the
most part these millions are wasted on issues that do not directly involve

162. See, e.g., Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 405 (1993) ("We have, of course, held that the
Eighth Amendment requires increased reliability of the process by which capital punishment may be

imposed.").
163. It has been estimated that the costs associated with a death penalty case range from three to
six times the total cost of maintaining that same person in prison for life. See Rudolph J. Gerber,
Death Is Not Worth It, 28 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 335, 356 n.106 (1996). For example, in California alone,
a recent study concluded that taxpayers could save an estimated $90 million per year by abolishing the

death penalty. See Ronald J. Tabak & J. Mark Lane, The Execution ofInjustice:A Cost and Lack-ofBenefit Analysis of the Death Penalty, 23 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 59, 136 (1989) (citing Stephen
Magagnini, Closing Death Row Would Save State $90 Million a Year, SACRAMENTO BEE, Mar. 28,

1988, at 1, col. 1).
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the substance of the case. The cycle of excessive proceduralism in habeas
virtually guarantees that most capital cases will take many years to litigate
to conclusion. Not even the best recent efforts by the Court and Congress
have managed to reduce these delays substantially.
Substantive habeas review, on the other hand, is likely to produce two
First, habeas courts will eliminate
positive effects for the states.
in the post-trial review process,
weak
capital
cases
early
substantively
saving states considerable time and money. Second, substantively strong
capital cases will also be identified at an early stage of the review process,
thus greatly reducing the odds that a habeas court will later feel pressured
to find a procedural error where none really exists.
IV. Conclusion
In his classic article, Violence and the Wrd, the late Professor Robert
Cover wrote:
Capital cases . . . disclose far more of the structure of judicial
interpretation than do other cases. Aiding this disclosure is the
agonistic character of law: The defendant and his counsel search for
and exploit any part of the structure that may work to their
advantage. And they do so to an extreme degree in a matter of life
and death."
Capital litigation will never cease. Death row inmates will always
seek to prolong their lives through litigation. The only thing that will
change, over time, is the nature of the litigation. As Professor Stuntz has
explained, all litigants alter their claims depending on the costs and
probabilities of success of the various alternatives. 65 In capital habeas
cases, do we really want to continue to encourage the parties to focus their
energies on the litigation of procedural claims that often have little or no
relation to the substantive justice of the defendant's conviction and death
sentence? Would it not be much better, for both the defendant and society,
if at least some significant portion of the inevitable litigation in a capital
habeas case were refocused on substantive instead of procedural issues?
Professor Cover also wrote:
To any person endowed with the normal inhibitions against the
imposition of pain and death, the deed of capital punishment entails
a special measure of the reluctance and abhorrence which constitute
the gulf that must be bridged between interpretation and action.
Because in capital punishment the action or deed is extreme and

164. Robert M. Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601, 1623 (1986).
165. See Stuntz, supra note 18, at 22 ("If the market functions as it should, lawyers raise claims
when their ex ante [probability of success] value ... is positive.").
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irrevocable, there is pressure placed on the word-the interpretation
that establishes the legal justification for the act." s
For the past twenty-five years, we have required habeas courts to use
procedural words to justify the imposition of death in capital cases. Such
procedural words are simply not up to the task. We need to empower
habeas courts to use substantive words when dealing with death penalty
cases. Sometimes they will use those substantive words to justify reversing
the defendant's conviction or death sentence. Sometimes they will use
those substantive words to justify upholding them and sending the defendant on to his execution. Either way, however, we should rightly feel
better about the substantive justice of the outcome.

166. Cover, supra note 164, at 1622.

